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Jeffrey R. Brown, Arie Kapteyn, and Olivia S. Mitchell

I. Introduction
Ever since prospect theory first emerged onto the scene, economists have come to
understand that important economic decisions can be substantially altered by the way in
which information is framed. Perhaps the best-known example was offered by Tversky
and Kahneman (1981), who showed that presenting a public policy choice in terms of
“lives saved” versus “lives lost” dramatically shifted the proportion of the respondents
who supported a given policy. More generally, numerous experimental findings suggest
that individuals make decisions not based solely on the consequences or outcomes – as
would be predicted by traditional economic theory – but also based on how the choices
are framed.
In the retirement arena, recent experimental evidence has shown that, here too,
framing can influence the relative desirability of particular financial choices.

For

example, Brown et al. (2008) show that when payout lifetime annuities are presented in a
frame that emphasizes consumption features, these annuities are perceived to be more
attractive than non-annuitized assets. In contrast, when such products are presented in an
investment-oriented frame, the majority of respondents prefer the non-annuitized
alternative. In an experimental setting, Agnew et al. (2008) also show that framing that
highlights the negative features of annuitization makes individuals less likely to choose
them.

1

In this project, we apply the concept of framing to an important financial decision
that approximately 93% of all Americans will make as they enter into retirement: 1 when
to claim Social Security benefits. In the U.S. Social Security system, individuals are
entitled to claim benefits as early as age 62, but they can also defer the age at which they
claim to as late as age 70. Monthly benefit levels are adjusted for one’s claiming age,
and these adjustments can be substantial: for example, an individual who stops working
at age 62 but waits to claim benefits at age 70 will receive 76% more (real) dollars per
month for the rest of her life, than if she claimed benefits at age 62. This adjustment is
said to be “actuarially fair,” in that the expected presented value of the two streams of
benefits will be equal for individuals with average population mortality. 2
Though financially the two benefit streams are designed to be equal in expected
present value for the average individual, they are generally not equivalent when viewed
through an expected utility framework. Heterogeneity of economic circumstances and/or
preferences can lead to different optimal claiming ages for different individuals (e.g.,
Coile et al. 2002; Hurd et al. 2004). For example, liquidity constrained individuals with a
high disutility of labor and above-average expected mortality rates may find it optimal to
claim early. In contrast, risk averse consumers with non-annuitized financial wealth may
find it optimal to delay claiming because delayed claiming is effectively akin to

1

According to the Social Security Administration, 93% of all U.S. workers in 2010 were covered under the
U.S. Social Security system. (http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/basicfact.htm)
2
This project abstracts from the question of whether additional years of work would change future benefits,
as well as the question of how delayed claiming might influence spousal and survivor benefits. This is
because we are focused here only on how individual claiming might vary with different frames. In a recent
survey, 75% of respondents indicated that they understand that benefits need not be claimed at the time
they stop work (Greenwald et al. 2010b).
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purchasing additional amounts of inflation-indexed annuitized income that will last for
life, which the literature on annuities suggest would be welfare-enhancing for many. 3
Rather than assuming that the choice of one’s claiming date is a purely rational
outcomes-based decision, we posit that individuals may be sensitive to the manner in
which claiming information is framed. To study this, we have devised an experiment
which presents individuals with alternative information formats about how benefits are
adjusted if they were to claim benefits early versus later. These alternative frames are
shown to participants in the RAND American Life Panel (ALP), an internet-based
survey. Panel participants were randomized into one of 10 groups, and each group was
presented the same underlying claiming information but in different frames.

It is

important to emphasize that the underlying financial information provided to participants
– namely, the monthly benefit they would receive at alternative ages – was unaffected by
the frame: only how this information was presented was altered. We then asked the
participants at what age they would claim benefits given each frame, and we compare
results to determine if the frame seems to alter anticipated claiming ages.
The first of the ten frames we designed serves as a “baseline,” by depicting the
information as neutrally as possible. 4 This frame is quite similar to the approach currently
(since 2008) used by the Social Security Administration in its public information on
claiming. The second frame we designed to emphasize a “breakeven” concept, i.e., an
approach that emphasizes the minimum number of years one would need to live in order
for the nominal sum of the incremental monthly payments that arise from delay to offset
the income forgone during the period of delay. This approach emphasizes the financial
3

The annuity literature is lengthy and rich, beginning with Yaari (1965) and most recently including
Davidoff et al. (2005) and Horneff et al. (2007, 2009).
4
We recognize that even “neutral” frames may not always be perceived as neutral by the general public.

3

aspect of the decision – indeed, framing it similar to a risky gamble – while downplaying
insurance aspects of the choice. The breakeven approach is consistent with how Social
Security claims representatives often presented this choice to potential claimants, at least
prior to 2008. This approach is also used in the private sector financial advice and
planning industry (c.f., Charles Schwab, 2010).
The remaining eight frames present to respondents combinations of differences
along three dimensions: (i) consumption versus investment; (ii) gains versus losses; and
(iii) older versus younger reference ages. The first of these is motivated by the work of
Brown et al. (2008) where they found important differences in the reported attractiveness
of life annuities, depending on whether these were described using “consumption
language” or “investment language.” The second dimension uses “gain” versus “loss”
languages to portray the actuarial adjustment for later versus earlier claiming. The third
dimension varies the initial age used to “anchor” individuals in the presentation.
In all frames, respondents are provided with a “sliding scale” showing monthly
benefit amounts at all ages between 62 and 70 (in monthly increments). An individual
can use a computer mouse to slide along the scale and watch the benefits change with
each claiming age. The initial “starting point” for the claim age indicator matches the
reference age provided in each frame. After viewing a frame, individuals are asked to
use the sliding scale to pinpoint the age at which they think they are most likely to claim
benefits. (Screen shots of the frames and the slider are presented in Appendix A).
We find several important differences across frames. The single largest effect is
that using the “breakeven analysis” leads to substantially earlier expected claiming dates
than any of the other nine frames. For example, relative to the baseline “neutral” frame,

4

showing the respondents a breakeven frame leads people to say they will claim earlier, by
12-15 months (depending on specification). The magnitude of this result is quite large
compared to prior estimates of how changes in economic variables influence retirement
dates. 5
Smaller, but still significant, differences obtain across other frames. Joint tests
indicate that, overall, presentation of gains leads to later claiming than losses. We also
find evidence of an “anchoring” effect with regard to age. For example, we find that
presenting respondents with a later age, from which they can then evaluate benefit
changes, tends to have the effect of getting them to claim later. We find that presenting
respondents with a consumption gain frame anchored at age 66 yields the highest
claiming age, though several others also generate significantly later claiming ages than
the neutral frame (e.g. the investment gain frame with anchoring at 66, and both the
consumption loss and investment loss frame at 70.) The breakeven approach used in the
past by SSA seems to lead to substantially earlier claiming – compared to the neutral
frame, the breakeven frame appears to induce claiming around one year earlier.
These findings are important for our understanding of economic behavior and also
for practical policy purposes. At an academic level, we provide further evidence that
even high-visibility, high-stakes financial decisions – in this case, when to claim Social

5

For example, Coronado and Perozek (2003) find that each additional $100,000 of unexpected gains from
stocks is associated with retiring only two weeks earlier than expected. Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999)
review the literature on the economic determinants of retirement behavior and conclude that changes in
pension and Social Security benefits have small economic impacts on the choice of retirement age, as do
Gustman and Steinmeier (2004; 2008). The present analysis focuses on Social Security benefit claiming
decisions, as distinct from retirement decisions, and one might expect the claiming elasticity to be larger
than the retirement elasticity. A few analysts (Benitez-Silva and Frank, 2008; Honig and Reimers 1996)
examine interactions between claiming and work patterns but they are interested in rewards to continued
employment, whereas here we explore determinants of the claiming decision independent of the return-towork decision.

5

Security benefits – are sensitive to how the information is presented. One interpretation
of our results is that they cast doubt on the purely economic model of decision-making,
by showing that individual decisions are influenced by factors other than ultimate
consumption outcomes. At a practical policy level, our study indicates that the Social
Security Administration (SSA) as well as other public or private sector actors can present
information to participants in ways that can strongly influence behavior -- even when the
actual information content is unchanged. This is particularly relevant for an agency such
as the SSA that prides itself on providing relevant information without providing
“advice.” Our findings suggest that individuals are very likely to adjust their claiming
behavior, depending on how the information is presented.
In what follows, Section II provides a very brief primer on how Social Security
benefit claiming works, including a discussion of the actuarial adjustment process. In
Section III, we discuss our research methodology including details about the RAND
American Life Panel. In section IV, we explain the motivation underlying our choice of
the 10 frames that we tested. Results are discussed in section V, and a short conclusion
appears in Section VI.

II. Social Security Benefits and Claiming
How Social Security benefits are adjusted depending on the claiming date
A covered worker who has contributed to the Social Security system for
sufficiently long (roughly 10 years to be fully insured) 6 confronts a range of choices
regarding when he can file for, or “claim,” his Social Security benefits. Age 62 is the
6

Technically, an individual is considered fully insured once they have earned 40 “quarters of coverage. In
2010, an individual earns a quarter of coverage – up to a maximum of 4 per calendar year – for each $1,120
of covered earnings. See http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/QC.html for more information.

6

earliest that one can claim as a retired worker, and this is also known as the “Early
Retirement Age” (ERA). The rules also specify a Normal Retirement Age (NRA) at
which “full” or unreduced benefits can be paid; if the worker claims prior to that age,
payments are reduced by 6 2/3% for each year below the NRA. The NRA is currently age
66 (for those born 1943-54, rising to 67 for people born 1960 and later).
The SSA computes benefits by selecting a worker’s highest 35 years of earnings
and indexing them so nominal earnings are adjusted to “near-current wage levels.” 7
Next, the agency computes the worker’s Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME)
over the 35-year period by averaging all indexed values (including zeros, if any) and
dividing by 12. Then the basic benefit or Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is computed
as a nonlinear function of the worker’s AIME; this is the base amount from which
benefits are calculated. If the worker claims benefits at the NRA, his benefit equals 100%
of his PIA. However, if he claims at some younger age, his benefit amount is reduced by
the 6 2/3% per year he claims early, and the reduction continues for the rest of his life.
For instance, at age 62 he would receive a PIA reduced by 25%. 8 Conversely, if he were
to leave work but delay claiming beyond the NRA, his benefits are increased by 8% per
year of age beyond the NRA for the remainder of his life; this is the Delayed Retirement
Credit (DRC).

9

In other words, the age one stops working need not equal the age at

which one claims benefits. 10

7

This is computed as the year in which a workers turns age 60; for more information, see
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/retirebenefit1.html
8
Taken from http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/quickcalc/earlyretire.html. Benefits payable to spouses and
survivors are also adjusted based on the covered worker’s claiming age, but we abstract from this in the
present study (for more discussion see Coile et al. 2002 and Mahaney and Carlson 2008).
9
In addition, Social Security benefits are annually adjusted for cost-of-living.
10
And this difference is widely appreciated; see Greenwald et al. (2010). In practice, the majority of
workers (over 90%) claim when first eligible at age 62; see Hurd and Rohwedder (2004) and Coile et al.
(2002).
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The intent of the early retirement reduction and delayed retirement credit
adjustments is to recognize that early claimants on average will receive benefits for a
longer period than those who delay claiming. These adjustments therefore seek to be
roughly ‘actuarially neutral,’ so that people who take a lower benefit early would expect
to receive, on average, about the same total amount in benefits over their lifetimes,
compared to those who wait for the higher monthly benefit but start receiving it later. In
other words, the choice of claiming age affects the monthly annuity stream, but for the
population on average, it does not alter the expected total lifetime sum of benefits
received.
Other Factors Influencing the Claiming Decision
The prior discussion of the effect of claiming age on benefits, while accurate, is a
simplification of the broader claiming decision. In reality, there are a number of complex
factors that go into the consideration of an optimal claiming date.
An important simplification is that this paper is focused specifically on the
claiming decision, rather than the broader impact of benefit amounts on labor force
participation. Technically, the claiming decision is fully independent of one’s labor force
participation status: people need not claim upon leaving the labor force, and they need
not be retired to claim. In practice, of course, there are obvious connections between
retirement and Social Security claiming decisions. For example, if continue to stay in the
labor force while delaying claiming, their monthly benefit may rise both because of the
actuarial adjustment and because of the additional years of earnings potentially increasing
one’s PIA. Additionally, low-wealth, liquidity-constrained individuals may not have the
resources to provide for their consumption after retirement if they did not claim Social

8

Security, and thus the claiming decision may be tightly linked with broader labor force
participation concerns.
Another reason that labor force participation and claiming are intertwined in
practice is the Social Security “earnings test.” As described by the Social Security
Administration, if you continue to work after claiming benefits, and if you are younger
than the Normal Retirement Age, “$1 in benefits will be deducted for each $2 you earn
above the annual limit.” 11 Importantly, the reduction in benefits that results from the
application of the earnings test is “returned” to the beneficiary in the form of higher
future benefits, although it is unclear how widely this feature is understood by those
affected. 12
While all of these factors – and others – are quite important to consider when
evaluating an optimal retirement age, we abstract away from these considerations in our
experimental design. Doing so has a distinct advantage of keeping the experimental
frames as clean and simple as possible. Equally importantly, this simplification does not
present a problem for our analysis for reasons that we will describe in more detail in the
next section.

III. Study Design
Focus Groups

11

http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/236/~/effects-of-working-and-receiving-socialsecurity-retirement-benefits. For 2010, the annual limit is $14,160. In the year one reaches the normal
retirement age, the reduction is $1 for every $3 above a higher limit, up until the month one reaches the
NRA. .
12
We also abstract from the possibility that an insured individual’s claiming decision may affect the aftertax maximum family benefit received by the entire household.

9

Prior to launching our quantitative survey, we conducted a large number of focus
groups in the Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. areas. These
focus groups served two distinct purposes. The first purpose, and the one most relevant
to this paper, is that we used these groups to ensure that the language we used in the
frames that we ultimately tested in the online survey (which can be found in Appendix A
and discussed in Section IV below) was clear and salient to the participants. Indeed, the
focus groups were quite useful in this regard, and they helped us to develop frames that
respondents considered distinct along the margins that we wished to test, while
maintaining their symmetry along other dimensions. The second purpose of the focus
groups was to gain an understanding of a broader set of issues related to how individuals
view the role of Social Security in retirement. While those findings are not discussed in
the present paper, interested readers will find a summary of the qualitative findings in
Greenwald & Associates (2010a).
American Life Panel
After testing our frames (to be discussed in more detail in Section IV, below), we
fielded a survey through the RAND American Life Panel (ALP). The ALP is a sample of
approximately 3,000 households who are regularly interviewed over the Internet. An
advantage relative to most other Internet panels is that the ALP is mostly based on a
probability sample of the US population. 13 Currently, the panel comprises over 3000

13

ALP respondents have been recruited in one of three ways. Most were recruited from individuals age 18+
who were respondents to the Monthly Survey (MS) of the University of Michigan's Survey Research
Center (SRC). The MS is the leading consumer sentiment survey that incorporates the long-standing
Survey of Consumer Attitudes and produces, among others, the widely used Index of Consumer
Expectations. Each month, the MS interviews approximately 500 households, of which 300 households are
a random-digit-dial (RDD) sample and 200 are reinterviewed from the RDD sample surveyed six months
previously. Until August 2008, SRC screened MS respondents by asking them if they would be willing to
participate in a long term research project (with approximate response categories “no, certainly not,”
“probably not,” “maybe,” “probably,” “yes, definitely”). If the response category is not “no, certainly not,”
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active panel members, of whom approximately 5% respond to the questionnaires using a
WebTV.
Experimental Design
The experimental design consists of several separate waves of data collection. We
initiated the survey with a “pre-wave” in June of 2010, in which respondents were asked
a single question about when they expected to claim Social Security:
“We would next like to ask you a question about a different topic. As you know, in the
United States people can start claiming Social Security benefits between the ages of 62
and 70. At what age would you expect to start collecting these Social Security benefits?”

This question was asked to provide a baseline which we could then compare
against responses to future frames, and also to help us evaluate whether our frame
randomization which occurred thereafter was not biased with regard to the outcome of
interest. 14

respondents were told that the University of Michigan is undertaking a joint project with RAND. They
were asked if they would object to SRC sharing their information about them with RAND so that they
could be contacted later and asked if they would be willing to actually participate in an Internet survey.
Respondents who do not have Internet were told that RAND will provide them with free Internet. Many
MS-respondents are interviewed twice. At the end of the second interview, an attempt was made to convert
respondents who refused in the first round. This attempt includes the mention of the fact that participation
in follow-up research carries a reward of $20 for each half-hour interview. A subset of respondents
(approximately 500) was recruited through a snowball sample; here respondents were given the opportunity
to suggest friends or acquaintances who might also want to participate. Those friends were then contacted
and asked if they wanted to participate. Respondents without Internet (both in the Michigan sample and the
snowball respondents) were provided with so-called WebTVs (http://www.webtv.com/pc/), which allows
them to access the Internet using their television and a telephone line. The technology allows respondents
who did not have previous Internet access to participate in the panel and furthermore use the WebTVs for
browsing the Internet or use email. A new group of respondents (approximately 500) has recently been
recruited after participating in the National Survey Project, created at Stanford University with SRBI. This
sample was recruited in person, and at the end of their one-year participation, they were asked whether they
were interested in joining the RAND American Life Panel. Most of these respondents were given a laptop
and broadband Internet access. Recently, the American Life Panel has begun recruiting based on a random
mail and telephone sample using the Dillman method (see e.g. Dillman et al, 2008) with the goal to achieve
5000 active panel members, including a 1000 Spanish language subsample. If these new participants do not
have Internet access yet, they will also be provided with a laptop and broadband Internet access. These
panel members are not part of the sample used in this paper.
14
While most respondents (95%) provided an answer in the age 62-70 range, some did not. When
respondents did not answer in this age range, a follow-up question asked why not. Responses outside the
62-70 interval were often given by younger respondents who believe that, by the time they will be eligible,
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As described in detail in Section IV below, we test 10 different question frames.
In three waves spaced at least two weeks apart, respondents are shown six different
frames (two distinct frames per wave). These frames are randomly assigned in the
following way: for each respondent we drew six numbers randomly without replacement
from the set {1,2,…10}. These numbers determined which frames were shown to each
respondent and in which order. For example, if we drew the vector (5, 7, 3, 9, 10, 6) for a
given respondent, then that respondent is shown frames 5 and 7 in the first wave, frames
3 and 9 in the second wave, and frames 10 and 6 in the third wave. The frames are only
asked of respondent who have not already claimed a benefit and who have worked at
least 10 years (so that we can compute a projected Social Security benefit).

IV. The Frames
In what follows, we explain the rationale for the choice of these particular frames,
as well as our expectations about how alternative framing would affect the claiming
decision. (The actual text of each of the frames tested appears in Appendix A.)
Our baseline case is intended to be an approximation of Social Security’s current
“neutral” stance on claiming ages. This is differentiated from what we call here the
“breakeven” approach, which was used by SSA for many decades and which continues to
be used by many financial advisors in the private sector. Next we discuss the three
dimensions along which we vary our experimental frames, including: (i) the use of
consumption language versus investment language, (ii) framing actuarial adjustments for

the Social Security claiming age will have moved to higher ages, or they believe they will not receive any
Social Security benefit at all and express this by responding outside the range.

12

earlier and later claiming as gains versus losses, and (iii) the use of alternative anchoring
ages (including ages 62, 66 and 70).
a. Baseline Case: Symmetric Treatment of Gains and Losses (Anchored at Age 66)
Our baseline case is modeled on the Social Security Administration’s current
approach (in use since 2008) to discussing claiming ages (although we have simplified
and shortened the presentation considerably for survey purposes).

In essence, this

approach seeks to simply and clearly lay out “the facts” in a neutral manner, with a
symmetric treatment of earlier and later claiming. This approach is consistent with the
SSA’s emphasis on providing information but not advice to participants, in that it clearly
seeks to avoid biasing individuals in any particular direction. Rather, it simply states the
impact on benefits of claiming at various ages.

Because this frame is intended to be

neutral, and because it reflects the current public perspective of SSA on claiming ages,
we use this frame as the baseline against which other frames are compared.
b.“Breakeven Analysis” (Anchored at Age 62)
Previous to 2008, one of the tools used by the SSA when providing information
on the impact of claiming at various ages was to use a so-called “breakeven” analysis.
Under this approach, individuals were told what their benefit would be at an early age
(e.g., 62) and some later age (e.g., 63). They were then informed that, by delaying
claiming from 62 to 63, they would “forfeit” a year of benefits. 15 In return for the

15

SSA field offices have long been equipped with a software program that claims representatives can use to
compute break-even dates for individuals who inquired about how benefits changed with the claiming date
(known by SSA as “month of election,” or MOEL). Numerous conversations we have held with SSA field
office representatives suggest that this break-even analysis was widely used prior to 2008. Indeed, the use
of the break-even analysis was codified in the training manuals for employees: as recently as 2007, the
training manual for Title II Claims Representatives (i.e., SSA employees who help citizens claim benefits,
among other responsibilities) includd a discussion of documentation required for “Month of Election”
(MOEL) cases. It states “if the claimant chooses the later of the two possible MOELs, he will forfeit the
benefits he could have received with the earlier MOEL” (emphasis added).

13

deferral, they would receive a higher monthly benefit from age 63 on. But the breakeven
presentation emphasized that people would not come out ahead unless they lived until at
least to age X, where X was defined as the age at which the cumulative nominal benefit
payouts received were equal.

This approach combines some elements of both the

negative annuity framing explored by Agnew et al (2008) and the investment frame
explored by Brown et al (2008), both of which have been shown to reduce the perceived
desirability of annuitization.
While this breakeven analysis was accurate, it is also true that the framing of this
approach implicitly places zero value on the insurance aspect of delaying claiming. In
essence, it provided a simplistic financial calculation which emphasized that later
claimers would be “behind,” until they reached a far distant breakeven date. As a result,
this approach placed little emphasis on the additional value that individuals who deferred
could receive for the rest of their lives beyond the breakeven date. This practice is akin
to considering only the actuarial aspect of the decision, without taking into account the
broader utility rewards of an annuity, which arise from risk aversion and protection
against longevity risk. Indeed, in direct contrast to highlighting the insurance aspects of
Social Security, this approach frames the decision to delay claiming more as a gamble,
the outcome of which depends upon how long one lives.
It is worth noting that this breakeven approach is not unique to the Social Security
Administration; in fact a widely referenced article by the Schwab Center for Financial
Research (2010) 16 also discusses the claiming decision using a breakeven analysis. Our

16

For further information see
http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/research_strategies/market_insight/retirement_strategies/planning/
when_should_you_take_social_security.html

14

hypothesis is that this breakeven approach is likely to bias individuals toward claiming
benefits earlier, than would a more neutrally worded frame.
c. Consumption versus Investment
As noted earlier, in a prior study Brown et al. (2008) showed that how individuals
view the value of life annuities relative to other financial products depends on whether
annuities are presented in a “consumption frame” or an “investment frame.” That is,
when consumers are conditioned to think in terms of investments (e.g., when the
presentation uses investment terminology such as “invest” and “return”), the life
annuities are made to appear unattractive.

This is because life annuities are then

perceived as paying low returns, being illiquid, and possibly even seeming “risky”
(because the amount an annuitant gets back depends on how long he lives). By contrast,
in a consumption frame (e.g., a frame that emphasizes one’s ability to consume
throughout life), a life annuity tends to be viewed as a very attractive form of insurance.
While Brown et al. (2008) found powerful effects on the attractiveness of life
annuities relative to non-annuitized products, that analysis did not provide evidence on
whether these alternative frames have an effect on the desirability of “earlier” versus
“later” annuitization. But given the magnitude of the effects they found (roughly 70% of
respondents preferring a life annuity to a savings account in a consumption frame, versus
about 20% in an investment frame), this distinction is potentially quite important to the
Social Security claiming context. It is worth noting that the break-even frame is itself a
quite negative form of an investment frame, one that emphasizes the risk of not living
long enough to recoup one’s lost year of benefits. The investment language used in these
additional frames focuses on “returns” but without explicating pointing out the “risk” of
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not breaking even. This will allow us to determine whether it is the break-even analysis
per se, or the investment-oriented language more generally, that influences claiming
behavior.
d. Gains versus Losses
The asymmetry in how individuals treat gains versus losses is one of the bestknown results (at least among economists) from the psychology literature on choice.
Most prominently, Kahneman and Tversky (1981) found that individuals exhibited an
asymmetry between gains and losses. Specifically, they found in a situation of choice
under uncertainty that people sometimes exhibit a preference for a certain gain of $ p * X
to an uncertain gain of $X with probability p, while at the same time preferring an
uncertain loss of $X with probability p, to a certain loss of $ p * X .
Relating this to the context of benefit claiming, it is possible to express actuarial
adjustments in terms of a gain (e.g., delaying claiming by one year will increase your
benefit by $X per month) or a loss (e.g., claiming one year earlier will reduce your
benefit by $X per month). Accordingly, we expect that this gain/loss distinction may
have important interactions with the consumption/investment distinction. As noted by
Brown et al. (2008), additional annuitization may look very attractive in a consumption
frame, while it may look less attractive in an investment frame. It is also, therefore,
possible that gains and losses will be interpreted differently in each of these contexts.
e. Age Anchors
As discussed at length by Mussweiler et al. (2004), “anchoring effects pervade a
variety of judgments, from the trivial (i.e., estimates of the mean temperature in
Antarctica) … to the apocalyptic (i.e., estimates of the likelihood of nuclear war) … In
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particular, they have been observed in a broad array of different judgmental domains,
such as general-knowledge questions, price estimates, estimates of self-efficacy,
probability assessments, evaluations of lotteries and gambles, legal judgment, and
negotiation.” 17 In our context, a very natural and salient anchoring point is the age that is
first presented in each frame. Given that we are exploring both gains and losses, some
variation in anchoring ages is useful. For example, while one can easily discuss gains in
a frame anchored at age 62, it is not possible to anchor a loss frame at 62 because 62 is
the earliest claiming age, and thus there is no way to characterize a loss from claiming
earlier than this. Similarly, it is easy to anchor losses at age 70 (the maximum claiming
age), but not gains. For this reason, in the experimental treatments that we describe next,
the gain frames are anchored at 62, and the loss frames at 70. In order to distinguish the
gain/loss hypothesis from age anchoring, we also include both gain and loss frames that
are anchored at age 66.
f. The Ten Different Frames
Putting these various permutations together results in 10 distinct frames,
described more completely in the Appendix. Below we refer to these frames as follows:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
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Baseline (neutral)
Breakeven
Consumption Gain from Age 62
Consumption Gain from Age 66
Consumption Loss from Age 66
Consumption Loss from Age 70
Investment Gain from Age 62
Investment Gain from Age 66
Investment Loss from Age 66
Investment Loss from Age 70

We have excluded the references included in the original quote. For these, as well as a full description of
findings, see: http://social-cognition.uni-koeln.de/scc4/documents/PsychPr_04.pdf.
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g. How our Experimental Design Handles Complexity and Heterogeneity
As discussed above, there will be heterogeneity in the optimal claiming date
based on differences in economic situations as well as preferences. Heterogeneity also
results from the numerous “real-life” complicating factors that would rationally influence
the choice of an optimal claiming date, including the labor force participation issues, the
earnings test, and spousal or child benefits.
Fortunately, our experimental design does not require that we know the optimal
claiming date for any individual. Furthermore, our design allows us to dramatically
simplify the scenarios that individuals face (including focusing on a single individual and
avoiding a discussion of the earnings test).
There are three reasons that our design does not require that we specific all
relevant information. First, our experimental design is premised on the idea that if an
individual is making a rational optimizing decision, that optimal decision will be based
on how (possibly unobservable) factors important to that individual map into utility
outcomes. Because our framing experiment holds the relevant outcomes fixed in all
cases, and only changes the way the claiming process is framed, optimizing individuals
would be insensitive to frame changes. While the omission of a discussion of the
earnings test, for example, might lead to answers that differ from those that the
respondent would give if such information was provided, it is important to emphasize that
the same information is provided or omitted in all frames, and we are examining
differences across frames in how the same information is presented.
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Second, we randomize individuals into various treatment groups. Thus, there are
no concerns about self-selection based on differences in the salience of the complicating
factors that we have simplified away.
Third, because we expose individuals to multiple frames, we are able to conduct
some analyses including individual fixed effects, meaning that we are implicitly
controlling for all unobservable differences across individuals.
In essence, our identifying assumption is that any biases introduced into the
expected claiming age by our omission of some factors are independent of how the
information that we are providing is framed.

V. Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the ALP sample used in the experiment;
we also provide average expected claiming ages reported by respondents about six weeks
before the start of the experiment (the June 2010 question discussed in Section III). Here
and in the remainder of the paper, claiming ages are expressed in terms of the number of
months after the date when the respondent turns 62. Thus for example a “claiming age”
of 36 means age 65 and zero months (which is 36 months after one’s 62nd birthday.)
A few points are worth noting from the third column of Table 1. First, women
indicate that they plan to claim Social Security benefits about four months later than men.
Planned claiming ages also rise with education and income: in both cases, those in the
highest category say they intend to claim benefits about 15-16 months later than the
lowest category. Planned claiming ages are also slightly later for younger respondents.
Thus those younger than age 50 say they plan to claim about two to four months later
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than respondents over age 55. This is likely an underestimate of the population
difference, since our sample is restricted to individuals not yet retired (so anyone over 55
who self-described himself as retired is not included). These summary statistics are
offered for general interest, though it is worth noting that, because we randomize
exposure to the frames, we would not anticipate that these baseline differences will have
any impact on results across frames. Further, in specifications that include individual
fixed effects, these differences will be directly controlled.
Table 1 here
Figure 1 shows average expected claiming ages arrayed by frame across the six
presentations. One can see quite clearly that the breakeven frame yields – by far – the
earliest intended claiming age. There is also a suggestion of a difference between gain
and loss frames, where the gain frames yield a somewhat later claiming age than the loss
frames. Below we verify these results using multivariate regression models.
Figure 1 here
Table 2 presents average claiming ages for the various frames administered to the
ALP broken down by treatment, and Figure 2 shows the same information in the form of
a bar chart. Once again, the “breakeven” frame generates by far the lowest claiming age.
For example, in wave 1.1 (the first treatment in the first wave), the breakeven frame
generates a claiming age that is between 22 and 26 months earlier than the claiming age
generated by the frames that take 66 as an anchoring age.
Table 2 and Figure 2 here

We are aware that there could be some ‘spillover’ from the first to the second
treatment within a wave. That is, when reading the second frame presented in a wave, the
respondent might remember what he answered when shown the first frame, and possibly
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even offer the exact same age. Our data do indeed reveal many instances where
respondents’ first and second answers within a wave are identical. Below we analyze this
pattern more formally.

Spillovers help explain for instance why the claiming age

associated with the breakeven frame is quite a bit higher in 1.2 (wave 1, exposure 2) and
2.2, than in 1.1 and 2.1, respectively.
Table 3 and Figures 3-6 report intended claiming ages (now averaged across all
waves) by frame and demographics and show that there are some differences (below we
test for significance more formally). Women tend to be somewhat more responsive to the
difference between gain frames and loss frames than men, deferring intended claiming
ages more when benefit enhancements are emphasized. Younger people and less
educated individuals appear to be more responsive to framing than older people and
respondents with a college degree. The last column in Table 3 shows the variance of the
average claiming ages across the ten frames, which we interpret as a measure of how
sensitive respondents are to the different frames. The variance proves to be considerably
larger for less-educated respondents than for respondents with a college degree,
suggesting that respondents with a lower education are more susceptible to framing
effects. The age pattern is not quite monotonic, but it does suggest more susceptibility to
framing among the young versus the older respondents.
Table 3 and Figures 3-6 here
It is useful to summarize these differences using multivariate regression analyses,
with results appearing in Table 4. In all five columns, the dependent variable is the
number of months after age 62 that the respondent indicates he intends to claim his Social
Security benefits. The first three columns of Table 4 present results from regression
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analyses pertaining to the first wave. In the first two columns, we regress the number of
months a respondent indicates he will claim post-62 on nine treatment dummies, one for
each frame, with the omitted category being the baseline frame (which uses an anchoring
age of 66 and describes the effects of changing claiming ages in symmetric terms). In the
first column, the dependent variable is the answer to the first frame in the wave (i.e. wave
1.1), while in the second column, the dependent variable is the response to the second
frame in the wave (wave 1.2). As noted before, it is possible that responses to the second
frame in a given wave could be influenced by responses to the first frame, so in the third
column of Table 4 we use as the dependent variable the answer to the second frame
exposure and also control for which frame the respondent saw in the first frame. These
“lagged” dummy variables are statistically significant (p=.02) though a comparison of the
second and third columns suggests that the estimates of the treatment effects are not
much affected.
Table 4 here
When combining results across waves, it is important to account for correlations
across observations that refer to the same respondents. A natural solution is to include
individual fixed effects, and results are given in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4. Accordingly
column 4 combines the results of all six waves, while column 5 once again includes
dummies for preceding treatments for waves 1.2, 2.2, and 3.2. That is, when the
dependent variable refers to wave 1.2, the treatment in wave 1.1 is included as an extra
explanatory variable; similarly for wave 2.2, the treatment in 2.1 is included as an
explanatory variable, and similarly for waves 3.2 and 3.1. The coefficients on these
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lagged treatments are not reported, but they operate in the expected direction and are
highly significant (p=.00).
The finding of most interest in Table 4 is that several of the treatment frame
coefficients differ significantly from that on the neutral frame where the anchoring age is
66. The models confirm that the breakeven SSA frame leads to substantially earlier
claiming – compared to the neutral frame, the breakeven frame appears to induce
claiming around 15 months earlier. This is an enormous impact, one that should be of
substantial interest to policymakers who seek to offer the best unbiased advice possible to
the working public.
It appears that the gain frames with anchoring at 66 yields the highest claiming
age, though several others also generate significantly later claiming ages than the neutral
frame – specifically the loss frames with anchoring at 70. We also note that gain frames
appear to lead to later claiming than do loss frames. The difference between the gain
frames at 66 and the loss frames at 66 are statistically significant (p=.01).
An alternative way to disentangle the effects of anchoring ages, gain vs. loss, and
consumption vs. investment, is provided in Table 5. Here we present the results of a
fixed effect analysis with the control variables now redefined to represent framing
dimensions (e.g., gain versus loss, or anchoring ages) rather than individual frames. As
before, the second column regression includes dummies for the preceding treatments
when the dependent variable refers to waves 1.2 and 2.2 (and these “lagged treatment
effects” are highly significant (p=.00), although the estimates in which we are most
interested are very similar with or without them.) The joint tests reported in Table 5
show that the gain and loss frames have different effects, depending on when an
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individual first says he is intending to claim. That is, gain frames lead to later claiming
ages than loss frames. The null hypothesis that consumption and investment frames have
equal effects cannot be rejected. Anchoring ages 66 and 70 are both associated with
significantly later claiming ages, compared to anchoring at age 62. The difference
between 66 and 70 is not significantly different from zero however.
Table 5 here
Two additional tables permit us to test whether sub-groups of people respond
differently to the manner in which benefits claiming is framed. Table 6 provides one
approach, wherein we adopt the same fixed effects model as in Table 5 but also add four
additional variables, namely interaction terms between the breakeven frame and sex, the
individual’s predicted benefit level if he claimed at age 62, a third variable indicating
whether a respondent reports to have credit card debt, and a fourth variable, which is a
measure of financial literacy. 18 Since the neutral frame is the reference category, one may
interpret the coefficient on the interaction variables as the effect of the factor on the
difference between the neutral frame and the breakeven frame.
In the first column, we see that compared to men, women are prompted to claim
six months earlier when they see the breakeven frame versus the neutral frame, and the
effect is statistically significant. (It will be recalled that these are fixed effects estimates,
so individual-specific factors are differenced out.) The second column shows the impact
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Specifically the interest_efficacy variable is also derived from the ALP and asks people the following
question: When making decisions about personal finances, how likely is it that you would be able to
effectively take into account the impact of interest compounding?
1 Extremely likely
2 Very likely
3 Somewhat likely
4 Very unlikely
5 Extremely unlikely
We coded the first two categories as 1 and the others as 0,
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of interacting respondents’ anticipated monthly Social Security benefits at age 62 (the
mean of that variable is $1,275.). The statistically significant estimate implies that if the
monthly benefit level were to rise from $1,275 to $2,275, this would narrow the gap
between the neutral and the breakeven frame by 8 months. The third column shows that
individuals with credit card debt are significantly more sensitive to the difference in
framing between neutral and breakeven (the difference widens by about 4.5 months). One
possible interpretation of this is that individuals with credit card debt find financial
management more challenging, and are thus more affected by framing. Finally, in the
fourth column we show the interaction between a financial literacy variable and the
breakeven frame. The financial literacy variable simply counts the number of correct
answers to a sequence of 17 financial literacy questions.
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The interaction is not

statistically significant, although potentially of quantitative significance. For instance if a
respondent moves from 50% correct to 100% correct, the gap between the neutral frame
and breakeven narrows by 7.25 months. (Mean percent correct in the sample is 68 in the
sample).
Table 6 here
Finally, in Table 7 we offer a more complex set of additional interaction terms,
again using a fixed effects framework obviating the need for non-time-varying controls.
Multicollinearity results from including such a large set of interactions, though the joint
test of the interaction terms reported at the bottom of the table indicates that the
significant differences by age and sex (at at least the 10% level) persist even in this more
complex case. And the anchoring age interactions are also quite significant.
19

The 17 questions measure knowledge in five domains: compound interest (4 questions), inflation (2
questions), risk diversification (3 questions), tax treatment of DC savings (4 questions), and employer
matches of DC contributions (4 questions).
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Table 7 here

VI.

Conclusions
We draw two primary conclusions from this project, one of them of interest to

academics, and the other of practical interest to policymakers and financial advisers. The
academic conclusion is that individuals appear to be behaving in a manner that is
inconsistent with purely rational economic optimizing behavior.

Were individuals

focusing solely on consumption outcomes, as standard life-cycle models posit, then such
decisions would be unaffected by how information is framed. Instead, the evidence
strongly suggests that how claiming information is framed has a strong influence on
expected claiming behavior.
The practical lesson to draw from these findings is that the manner in which
information is provided to plan participants can strongly shape behavior. As a result, a
group seeking to provide participants with what is believed to be unbiased information
might (intentionally or unintentionally) influence those decisions in important ways.
Indeed this research suggests – at least as a real possibility – that Social Security’s
historical emphasis on “breakeven analysis” may have inadvertently encouraged several
generations of American workers to claim benefits earlier than they would have done had
the information been presented in a different frame.

It is especially important to

understand these effects because – unlike the benefit rules themselves – the framing of
information is under the control of the SSA staff and administration, rather than
something requiring Congressional legislation to alter.
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We recognize that a limitation of this research is that it relies on stated intentions
about future claiming behavior, rather than on actual claiming decisions. In principle, it
would be possible to design an experiment that would allow SSA to test the impact of
framing on actual claiming decisions, especially now that many retirement benefit claims
are processed using internet-based on-line claiming. Such “real world” experiments
might be a very promising avenue for future analysis.
Another area for future investigation would be to examine other information
provided that might also inadvertently influence claiming behavior. For example, Brown
and Weisbenner (2008) point out that the current framing of the Windfall Elimination
Provision (WEP) may have the unintended consequence of making individuals affected
by the WEP feel (incorrectly) as if they are being denied benefits they have earned.
Another example where framing might influence decision-making is with regard to the
Social Security earnings test, which some appear to (incorrectly) view as a “tax” rather
than a reallocation of benefits to the same individual across time.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on the ALP Sample
Frequency
Percentage
Mean Claiming Age
(months>62)
GENDER
1 Male
598
41.6
39
2 Female
839
58.4
43
1437
100
AGE
18-40
388
27
42
41-50
405
28.2
42
51-55
275
19.1
38
>55
369
25.7
40
1437
100
EDUCATION
HS or less
232
16.1
35
Some college/ associate degree
577
40.2
39
College degree
628
43.7
50
1437
100
HH INCOME
<35000
302
21.1
31
35000-74999
592
41.2
43
>75000
541
37.7
47
Note: Table contains demographics for respondents to Wave 1. Mean claiming ages are based on
slightly fewer observations, due to missing claiming ages. Means are weighted

Table 2. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Wave
Frame
Wave 1.1 Wave 1.2 Wave 2.1Wave 2.2 Wave 3.1 Wave 3.2
Breakeven
39.6
47.9
41.6
45.0
44.1
46.9
66 neutral, c
54.5
57.6
58.5
60.8
61.1
64.2
62, gain, c
58.7
65.5
60.5
65.9
60.1
64.5
66, gain, c
62.7
63.3
61.2
64.0
59.4
64.1
70, loss, c
57.2
57.5
56.1
55.3
62.7
52.3
66, loss, c
65.3
61.5
57.7
63.3
53.6
59.3
62, gain, i
58.4
63.3
57.0
67.3
57.4
64.8
66, gain, i
63.1
62.2
60.3
65.9
66.1
60.4
70, loss, i
57.7
57.9
54.4
57.4
53.2
52.9
66, loss, i
62.2
61.5
59.2
61.1
61.7
57.1
Notes: Ages are expressed in months past age 62.
frames; “gain” or “loss” indicate if loss or gain frames were used;
“c” indicates a consumption frame, while “i” indicates an investment fram
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Table 3. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Respondent Characteristics

Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted data. See Table 2 for
additional definitions.

GENDER
Male
Female
AGE GROUP
18-40
41-50
51-55
>55
EDUCATION
HS or less
Some college/
associate
degree
College degree
HH INCOME
<35000
35000-74999
>75000
OVERALL
Average
Standard
Deviation
Frequency

Breakeven

66
neutral,
cons

62,
gain,
cons

FRAME
66,
70,
gain, loss,
cons cons

66,
loss,
cons

62,
gain,
inv

66,
gain,
inv

70,
loss,
inv

66,
loss,
inv

Variance

45.7
42.8

59.9
58.5

61.1
63.7

62.8
62.4

56.2
56.9

60.3
60.2

60.7
61.7

60.5
64.9

55.1
55.8

59.3
61.4

24.4
40.0

44.5
46.1
40.4
43.9

63.2
63.1
59
49.7

63.7
64.5
60.4
60.8

67.3
65.3
59.9
56.3

63.2
60.4
55.4
47.6

64.4
63.5
58
53

62.7
63.6
62.1
56

68
67.2
62.9
53.3

58.8
59.4
53.4
50.1

65.4
63.3
58.6
53.6

44.9
34.7
42.2
23.2

38.5

55.4

60.2

60.6

52.7

57.8

55.9

57.9

55.6

59

40.9

40.8
48.8

55.8
63.2

61.9
64.2

60
65.5

56.8
58.1

59.5
61.6

61.1
63.2

59.8
67.5

51.9
58.7

57.1
64

39.0
28.0

44.3
43.2
44.9

58.9
58.7
59.6

63.6
61.7
62.9

60.7
63
62.9

56.5
56
57.3

58.6
60.6
60.6

59.2
60.9
62.6

62.2
62.2
64.3

57.4
54.1
56.1

60.7
61.2
59.6

28.4
35.6
31.6

44.1

59.1

62.6

62.5

56.6

60.2

61.3

63

55.5

60.5

31.5
744

29.5
736

28.9
838

30.3
777

29.9
754

31.2
769

28.6
811

30.1
807

30.3
719

30.4
779

31
Table 4. Framing Regressions: Dependent Variable is Expected Claiming Age
Note: Dependent variable is expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted data.
Reference frame is Age 66, neutral (see text). Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; *
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. See Table 2 and text for additional definitions.
FRAME

Breakeven
62_gain_c
66_gain_c
70_loss_c
66_loss_c
62_gain_i
66_gain_i
70-loss-i
66-loss-i
Constant
Observations
R-squared
p gain at 62
cons=inv
p gain at 66
cons=inv
p loss at 70
cons=inv
p loss at 66
cons=inv
p cons at 66
gain=loss
p inv at 66
gain=loss
p joint
cons=inv
p joint
gain=loss
Number of id
p previous
dummies zero

Wave 1.1

Wave 1.2

All waves,
fixed
effects

-9.695
(2.62)**
7.918
(2.26)*
5.711
(1.60)
-0.074
(0.02)
3.957
(1.09)
5.713
(1.63)
4.683
(1.26)
0.351
(0.09)
3.903
(1.04)
57.557
(22.34)**
1417
0.02
0.51

Wave 1.2,
lagged
dummies
included
-10.333
(2.79)**
8.542
(2.43)*
6.467
(1.82)
0.581
(0.16)
4.947
(1.37)
6.078
(1.73)
5.229
(1.41)
1.700
(0.45)
4.501
(1.20)
53.121
(14.18)**
1417
0.05
0.465

-15.696
(16.03)**
1.053
(1.12)
3.736
(3.88)**
2.740
(2.81)**
1.300
(1.35)
0.359
(0.38)
3.321
(3.50)**
1.948
(1.98)*
1.060
(1.10)
58.643
(85.40)**
7734
0.09
0.45

All waves,
fixed effects,
lagged dummies
included
-15.932
(16.21)**
1.031
(1.09)
3.988
(4.13)**
2.920
(2.98)**
1.641
(1.70)
0.460
(0.48)
3.623
(3.80)**
2.326
(2.35)*
1.282
(1.33)
57.903
(81.98)**
7734
0.10
0.538

-14.969
(4.29)**
4.150
(1.19)
8.191
(2.44)*
2.674
(0.78)
10.791
(3.03)**
3.823
(1.11)
8.546
(2.47)*
3.113
(0.79)
7.652
(2.12)*
54.540
(22.22)**
1436
0.05
0.92
0.916

0.778

0.735

0.657

0.698

0.911

0.909

0.764

0.416

0.545

0.395

0.988

0.904

0.801

0.708

0.452

0.620

0.666

0.011

0.015

0.804

0.839

0.849

0.016

0.013

0.944

0.971

0.944

0.827

0.903

0.969

0.884

0.862

0.010

0.009

1665

1665
0.00

0.02
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Table 5. Framing contrasts (Fixed Effect Models, All Waves: Dependent Variable is
Expected Claiming Age)
Note: Dependent variable measured in number of months after age 62, unweighted data.
Reference frame is Age 66, neutral (see text). Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; *
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. See Table 2 for additional definitions.
Table 5: Framing contrasts, fixed effects, all waves
All waves
All waves, lagged
dummies included
Breakeven
-12.876
-12.881
(10.94)**
(10.90)**
cons_loss
1.435
1.695
(1.59)
(1.87)
cons_gain
3.807
4.031
(4.23)**
(4.47)**
inv_loss
0.927
1.222
(1.03)
(1.35)
inv_gain
3.250
3.557
(3.64)**
(3.98)**
anchor_62
-2.822
-3.070
(4.30)**
(4.65)**
anchor_70
1.167
1.159
(1.70)
(1.67)
Constant
58.643
57.914
(85.41)**
(82.04)**
Observations
7734
7734
Number of id
1665
1665
R-squared
0.09
0.10
p cons_loss=gain
0.00
0.005
p inv_loss=gain
0.004
0.005
p gain_cons=inv
0.395
0.474
p loss_cons=inv
0.456
0.489
p anchor62=70
0.000
0.000
p joint gain=loss
0.002
0.002
p joint cons=inv
0.525
0.607
p previous dummies
0.00
zero
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Table 6. Fixed Effect Models With Interactions, All Waves: Dependent Variable is
Expected Claiming Age
Note: Dependent variable measured in number of months after age 62, unweighted data.
Reference frame is Age 66, neutral (see text). Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; *
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. See Table 2 for additional definitions.
FRAME
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Breakeven
-9.633
-23.383
-10.681
-16.790
(6.79)**
(7.60)**
(7.78)**
(5.70)**
Loss_c
1.432
1.412
1.425
1.120
(1.59)
(1.57)
(1.58)
(1.19)
Gain_c
3.796
3.781
3.798
3.660
(4.23)**
(4.21)**
(4.23)**
(3.91)**
Loss_i
0.927
0.918
0.912
0.916
(1.03)
(1.02)
(1.01)
(0.97)
Gain_i
3.253
3.227
3.257
3.110
(3.65)**
(3.62)**
(3.65)**
(3.33)**
anchor_62
-2.808
-2.807
-2.831
-2.837
(4.28)**
(4.28)**
(4.32)**
(4.13)**
anchor_70
1.171
1.180
1.169
1.160
(1.71)
(1.72)
(1.71)
(1.62)
Female* breakeven
-5.928
(4.08)**
Benefit62* Breakeven
0.008
(3.70)**
Cred. card debt* Breakeven
-4.485
(3.10)**
Fin. literacy* Breakeven
0.055
(1.50)
Constant
58.645
58.660
58.652
58.550
(85.52)** (85.52)**
(85.48)** (81.57)**
Observations
7734
7734
7734
6994
Number of id
1665
1665
1665
1445
R-squared
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
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Table 7. Fixed Effect Models With Interactions, All Waves: Dependent Variable is
Expected Claiming Age
Note: Dependent variable measured in number of months after age 62, unweighted data.
Reference frame is Age 66, neutral (see text).Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; *
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. See Table 2 for additional definitions.
Breakeven
Loss_c
Gain_c
Loss_i
Gain_i
anchor_62
anchor_70
Female*Breakeven
Female*Loss_c
female*Gain_c
female*Loss_i
female*Gain_i
Female*anchor_66
Female*anchor_70
agecat2*Breakeven
agecat2*Loss_c
agecat2*Gain_c
agecat2*Loss_i
agecat2*Gain_i
agecat2*anchor_66
agecat2*anchor_70
agecat3*Breakeven
agecat3*Loss_c
agecat3*Gain_c

(1)
-12.876
(10.94)**
1.435
(1.59)
3.807
(4.23)**
0.927
(1.03)
3.250
(3.64)**
-2.822
(4.30)**
1.167
(1.70)

(2)
-14.072
(3.28)**
-4.397
(1.36)
-0.138
(0.04)
-5.194
(1.60)
-1.695
(0.52)
-5.863
(2.42)*
0.740
(0.30)
-5.748
(2.41)*
0.474
(0.26)
-0.525
(0.29)
2.621
(1.43)
0.990
(0.55)
-0.782
(0.58)
-0.910
(0.47)
3.187
(1.04)
-0.311
(0.13)
0.046
(0.02)
0.229
(0.09)
0.135
(0.06)
-2.931
(1.70)
-0.582
(0.23)
2.394
(0.70)
-0.545
(0.20)
0.178
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agecat3*Loss_i
agecat3*Gain_i
agecat3*anchor_66
agecat3*anchor_70
agecat4*Breakeven
agecat4*Loss_c
agecat4*Gain_c
agecat4*Loss_i
agecat4*Gain_i
agecat4*anchor_66
agecat4*anchor_70
Constant

58.643
(85.41)**
7734
1665
0.09
0.00
0.004
0.395
0.456
0.000
0.002
0.525

Observations
Number of id
R-squared
p Loss_c=gain
p Loss_i=gain
p Gain_c=inv
p Loss_c=inv
p anchor62=70
p joint gain=loss
p joint cons=inv
p income interactions
p education interactions
p age interactions
p sex interactions
p anchor66=70
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

(0.07)
-1.243
(0.47)
1.340
(0.53)
-1.582
(0.83)
1.687
(0.60)
5.881
(1.81)
-1.686
(0.66)
0.977
(0.38)
1.133
(0.44)
-0.748
(0.30)
-2.272
(1.23)
-1.717
(0.65)
61.715
(25.55)**
7723
1663
0.10

0.53
0.743
0.275
0.777
0.674
0.122
0.098
0.003
0.056

36

Figure 1. Average Expected Claiming Ages by Frame

Months after Age 62

Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted.
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Figure 2. Average Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Wave
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted.
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Months After Age 62

Figure 3. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Respondent Sex
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted.
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Figure 4. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Respondent Age
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted.
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Figure 5. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Education (unweighted)
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted.
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Figure 6. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Respondent Income ($)
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted.
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Appendix: The Ten Frames
Frame 1: Baseline (Neutral)

40

Frame 2: Breakeven

41

Frame 3: 62, gain, consumption

42

Frame 4: 66, gain, consumption

43

Frame 5: 70, loss, consumption

44

Frame 6: 66, loss, consumption

45

Frame 7: 62, gain, investment

46

Frame 8: 66, gain, investment

47

Frame 9: 70, loss, investment

48

Frame 10: 66, loss, investment

